Mike Seager
Dec 9th, 2002
Phil 350

A Study of The Cosmological Argument
	
	I chose in this paper to tackle the largely debated and controversial cosmological argument for the existence of God.  Both Thomas Aquinas and Richard Taylor have done writings in favor of this, and I will be representing pieces from both in this paper.  Together they make up for where each other left off and make a pretty solid argument for the existence of God, which is why I have chosen to cover it.  Upon deep study I feel that I’ve come across some flaws that cannot be reconciled without considerable revision of the argument or without going deep into the nature of what reality and time is.  I will begin with Aquinas’ main arguments and then move into Taylor’s ideas of why there must be a necessary being.
	The basis of the cosmological argument is this: Everything has a cause, there cannot be an infinite regression of causes, and therefore there must be an original cause of the universe.  This original cause is God.  (By universe I refer to all existence.)  In order to deeply evaluate this argument you must break it up into parts. To begin I will examine the first premise, that everything must have a cause.  Aquinas proves this using Aristotle’s arguments that everything that moves has a mover, and that nothing is self moving.  Aquinas puts it best saying “Therefore, with respect to the same motion, nothing is both mover and moved.  Thus, nothing moves itself. (p186 Phil of Relig)”  This seems in agreement with conventional logic, so we will accept this premise as true.  However, it does raise the question that if nothing moves itself, what set God, or the original creator, into motion in the first place? 
	The second premise of the argument is that there can be no infinite regression of causes.  Imagine an ordered series of events.  If you remove the first event then all events cease, because they are all dependent on the first event.  If there is an infinite series of events, the first event is effectively removed and all the events become intermediate.  Aquinas and Taylor claim that this is impossible.  That there must be an original cause.  However, I do not believe this is necessarily true.  For instance, let’s take the possibility that reality is circular.  This states that what I am doing now will eventually cause my own existence, in a round about way.  That seems illogical, but if you then assume that this circle of time has always existed, in a cyclic form but overall unchanging fashion, it doesn’t seem so impossible.  However, for the sake of argument, we will accept this premise as true for now and move on.
	This brings us to the third premise and the idea that something must have always existed and therefor necessarily exists.  Taylor says that we can believe either of two things: That the universe was caused by something before it, which was in turn caused by something before it, into infinity, or that the universe or its causes were created by a creator which has always existed and has no cause itself.  Throwing out the first choice based on it’s impossibility, for the sake of argument, this leaves us with the notion of a creator.
	Taylor further explains by giving the example of finding a ball in the forest.  He says that the idea that it came from nothing at all, that is has always existed, is an idea few people would consider worthy of entertaining.  He then compares this ball to the universe, making the statement that if one considers the ball must have a cause, then one must also make the claim that the universe must also have a cause.  They are both two arbitrary objects made up of impermanent things, neither one has an obvious property calling for its necessary existence.  In fact, it’s easy to imagine both not existing without any absurdity. Later he explains that if something exists without a creator, then it must be its own reason for existence.  This entity must exist by its nature, and it must be impossible for it not to exist.  He implies that the universe is not the reason for its own existence, because it seems improbable that it is necessary.  However, he does mention that such an idea is possible, by saying:
“...It is possible that the world is in itself a necessary thing, even though it comprises of entirely things that are contingent.  This is logically possible, but is not plausible.  For we find nothing whatever in the world, any more than in it’s parts, to suggest that is exists by it’s own nature.” (p194 Phil of Relig)

	It should be noted that when dealing with proofs, this idea that it is logically possible for an alternative to what you are trying to prove to exist, even if improbable, negates any ability to prove your subject.  One is then arguing simply that their idea is the most probable.  This alone greatly weakens the cosmological argument.
	We have arrived at the appropriate time to consider the question more in-depth as to why the universe can’t have the same properties as God in regards to always existing.  I would like to examine one of Taylor’s reasonings.  His original text is as such:
“And it would, in any event, seem quite plainly absurd to say that if the world were compromised entirely of a single ball about six feet in diameter, or of a single grain of sand, then it would be contingent and there would have to be some explanation other that it self why such a thing exists, but that, since the actual world is vastly more complex that this, there is no need for an explanation of it’s existence, independent of itself” (191)

	This makes sense, and I agree with it.  However, God, being such an all powerful being is arguably much more complicated than the universe, especially if he created it.  So, in the above passage, substitute “God” for “world.”  The argument then becomes an equally strong proof for God needing a creator.  There needs to be some differing quality between God and the universe or else the idea of God being the initial cause over the universe, or even something before God is purely arbitrary.  Unfortunately, neither Aquinas nor Taylor really touch on this.
	This problem brings us to the idea of what it means to necessarily exist, and what qualities a necessary being must have.  For something to necessarily exist it must have certain properties, or, the lack of certain properties that would allow it to not exist.  For something to necessarily exist it cannot have the power to make itself not exist, and it must not have been put into existence by something else, for such ideas imply that at one point it didn’t exist or could not exist. It must be unchanging.  For, if one agrees with the premise that everything has a cause, all things that move have a mover, it would take an outside force to change this being and none would exist.  If the being were a personal being, it would have no wants or needs.  Those are caused by outside entities.  It would be content, perfect, have no desires, and, thus, do absolutely nothing.  It wouldn’t change its mind, and it definitely wouldn’t decide, suddenly, to bring more things into existence.  Why would it do that?  It would have to have a reason.  Unless, if it did not create the universe, it would not be necessary.  In other words, for a necessary being to create the universe, it would have to be logically impossible for it not to.  This would mean that the universe must have always existed as well, and be somehow tied to the necessary being.  However, the universe has motion, which still requires a cause.  This mean that somewhere inside this necessary being there is a cause for the universe to exist that is eternal and has always caused the universe and will always cause the universe.  And, it is necessary for the being’s existence to have this cause, or else it would not exist.
	Eventually one could say that the being’s creation could begin to act back upon it, causing it to do things, have feelings, and become personal.  But, if its creation has always existed then these actions must have always been acting upon it.  So, the being must have always been the way it is today.  This negates the being’s ability to function in our standard idea of time, for everything that shapes what it is has always been shaping what it is.  You have, in fact, an infinite regression of causes.
	But, what if the being exists outside of time, and time is simply a property of its creation?  This seems like a possible defense.   If its creation is bound by time and the being not, from the perspective of the being every possible influence that the creation has upon it happens simultaneously.  Thus, the being would be unchanging and its creation changing, and both entities would have always existed.  Under these circumstances, the cosmological argument seems possible, with a few premises.   If God is a necessary being, God must be able to exist outside of time, and it must be necessary for God’s existence to have created us.  Unfortunately for those of us seeking an answer, both premises are arguable.
	The first premise, that God exist outside of time, opens up the argument of exactly what time is and if it was created or is a logical necessity.  If time is a logical necessity than God, widely accepted to be bound by the laws of logic, cannot exist outside of it.  I would argue that time is simply a rate by which things happen, therefor isn’t an entity and is inherent, not created.  This means that nothing can logically exist outside of time.  However, I am not well versed on metaphysics, so I will leave the option open that it is possible for a being to exist outside of time, and leave the subject.
	The second premise is that if God is a necessary being, than it is necessary for God’s existence to have created the universe.  Otherwise the universe would not exist because he would have had no reason to create us.  For this to be true it would have to be impossible for us to imagine a scenario in which a necessary being could exist without creating us.  That is imaginable however, and, in fact, even seems more probable.  Creation does not seem to be a necessary trait for a necessary being.  The fact is, however, that we do exist, so we need to look for alternative scenarios.
	This brings us back to the cosmological argument.  If one accepts that an infinite regression is impossible, then it is in the third premise that we find the flaw.  God may exist, but it is not necessary for him to exist.  Rejecting infinite regression, it does seem that something must exist to have created us, but the same logic then suggests that the being would have no reason to do so, since nothing would be acting upon it.  It would do nothing.  This is the cosmological argument’s main flaw.

Works Cited

Peterson, Michael (editor) Philosophy of Religion, Selected Readings 2001: Oxford University Press, Oxford.